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Abstract
This report formalizes a notion of witnesses as the basis of certifying the correctness of software. The first part of the report is concerned with witnesses for the satisfaction of linear temporal logic specifications by infinite state programs and shows how such witnesses may be constructed via predicate abstraction and validated by generating and proving verification conditions. In addition, the first part of this report proposes the use of theorem provers based on Boolean propositional satisfiability (SAT) and resolution proofs in validating these verification conditions. In addition to yielding extremely compact proofs, a SAT-based approach overcomes several limitations of conventional theorem provers when applied to the verification of programs written in real-life programming languages.
The second part of this report formalizes a notion of witnesses of simulation conformance between infinite state programs and finite state machine specifications. The report also proves that computing a minimal simulation relation between two finite state machines is an NP-hard problem. Finally, the report presents algorithms to construct simulation witnesses of minimal size by solving pseudo-Boolean constraints. The author's experiments on several nontrivial benchmarks suggest that a SAT-based approach can yield extremely compact proofs-in some cases by a factor of over 10 5 -when compared to existing non-SAT-based theorem provers.
Introduction
There is an evident and urgent need for objective measures of confidence in the behavior of software obtained from untrusted sources. In general, the lack of trust in a piece of code stems from two sources: (1) the code producer and (2) the delivery mechanism of the code to the consumer. Unfortunately, the vast majority of current software assurance techniques target the above sources of mistrust in isolation but fail to account for them both.
For instance, cryptographic techniques are typically unable to say anything substantial about the runtime behavior of the program. Techniques such as sandboxing and analytic redundancy require mechanisms for runtime monitoring and appropriate responses to failure. Additionally, such approaches are inherently dynamic and unable to provide adequate levels of static correctness guarantees. Extrinsic software quality standards typically have a heavy focus on process and are usually quite subjective. Moreover, software qualities are weakly related to desired behavior, if at all.
This report presents a technique that uses proofs to certify software. More specifically, we certify a rich set of safety and liveness policies on C source code. Our approach consists of two broad stages. We first use model checking [Clarke 00, Clarke 82] in conjunction with Counterexample-Guided Abstraction Refinement (CEGAR) [Clarke 03 ] and predicate abstraction [Graf 97 ] to verify that a C program C satisfies a policy S. The policy S may be expressed either as a linear temporal logic (LTL) formula or a finite state machine.
Subsequently, we use information generated by the verification procedure to extract a witness Ω. We show how the witness may be used to generate a verification condition VC . We also prove that C respects the policy S iff VC is valid. The witness Ω is constructed and shipped by the code producer along with C and the proof P of VC . The code consumer uses Ω to reconstruct VC and verify that P truly corresponds to VC . Therefore, in our setting, the witness Ω and the proof P may together be viewed as the certificate that C respects S.
While the above strategy is theoretically sound, it must overcome two key pragmatic obstacles. First, since certificates have to be transmitted and verified, they must be small and efficiently checkable. Unfortunately, proofs generated by conventional theorem provers, such as cvc and vampyre, are often prohibitively large. Second, conventional theorem provers are usually unfaithful to the semantics of C. For example, they often do not support features of integer operations such as overflow and underflow. This lack of such supoort means that certificates generated by such theorem provers are, in general, not trustworthy. For example, the following VC is declared valid by most conventional theorem provers, including cvc and vampyre: ∀x (x + 1) > x. However, that statement is actually invalid according to the semantics of the C language, due to the possibility of overflow.
In this report, we propose the use of Boolean satisfiability (SAT) to solve both these problems. More specifically, we translate VC to a propositional formula Φ such that VC is valid iff Φ is unsatisfiable. Therefore, a resolution refutation (proof of the unsatisfiability) of Φ serves as a proof of the validity of VC . We use the state-of-the-art SAT solver zchaff [Moskewicz 01 ], which also generates resolution refutations, to prove that Φ is unsatisfiable. The translation from VC to Φ is faithful to the semantics of C and therefore handles issues such as overflow.
We have implemented our proposed technique in the ComFoRT [Chaki 05b] reasoning framework and experimented with several nontrivial benchmarks. Our results indicate that the use of SAT leads to extremely compact (in some cases over 10 5 times smaller) proofs in comparison to conventional theorem provers. One important reason for this improvement is that the SAT formulas generated have extremely small UNSAT-cores (i.e., subformulas that are themselves unsatisfiable). zchaff has sophisticated heuristics to locate small UNSAT-cores of its input formula. Since the core is small, so is its refutation. Further details of our experiments are provided in Section 7.
We believe that this report contributes not just to the area of software certification but to the much broader spectrum of scientific disciplines where compact proofs are desirable. Algorithms to compress proof representations are currently a topic of active research. This report demonstrates that the use of SAT technology is a very promising idea in this context.
The rest of this report is organized as follows. We discuss related work in Section 2 and present preliminary concepts in Section 3. In Section 4, we present our certification formalism for LTL policies, and in Section 5, we describe our technique for obtaining SAT-based certificates. In Section 6, we present our certification formalism for finite state machine policies. Finally, we describe our experimental results in Section 7 and conclude our ideas in Section 8. Arons and colleagues [Arons 01 ] have proposed techniques to heuristically (and automatically) lift an invariant for a small instance of a parameterized system to a candidate invariant for the entire system. The candidate invariant is then checked for validity since, unlike in our framework, it is not known whether the smaller instance of the parameterized system is an abstraction for the full instance.
Related Work
Certifying model checkers [Namjoshi 01, Kupferman 04] emit an independently checkable certificate of correctness when a temporal logic formula is found to be satisfiable by a finite state model. Namjoshi [Namjoshi 03 ] has proposed a two-step technique for obtaining proofs of µ-calculus specifications on infinite state systems. In the first step, a proof is obtained via certifying model checking. In the second step, the proof is lifted via an abstraction. This approach is more general than ours as far as LTL model checking is concerned but does not handle simulation. It also does not propose the use of SAT or provide experimental validation.
Magill and colleagues 1 have proposed a two-step procedure for certifying simulation conformance between an infinite state system and a finite state machine specification. In the first step, they certify that a finite state abstraction simulates the infinite state system. In the second step, they prove simulation between the finite state abstraction and the specification. Their approach does not cover LTL specifications and, in particular, is unable to handle liveness policies. Also, it does not propose the use of SAT.
Predicate abstraction [Graf 97 
Preliminaries
In this section, we present preliminary definitions and results. Let Act be a denumerable set of actions. We begin with the notion of labeled transition systems.
Definition 1 (LTS).
A Labeled Transition System (LTS) is a quadruple (S, Init, Σ, T ) where: (1) S is a finite set of states, (2) Init ⊆ S is a set of initial states, (3) Σ ⊆ Act is a finite alphabet, and (4) T ⊆ S × Σ × S is a transition relation.
Given an LTS M = (S, Init, Σ, T ), we write s α −→ s to mean (s, α, s ) ∈ T . Also, for any s ∈ S, and any α ∈ Σ we denote by Succ(s, α) the set of successors of s under α-in other words,
We now define our notion of LTL. Unlike standard practice, the flavor of LTL we use is based on actions instead of propositions. This distinction is, however, inessential as far as this report is concerned. The syntax of LTL is defined by the following grammar in Backus-Naur form (where α ∈ Act):
The semantics of LTL is fairly standard, and we do not describe it here. In fact, we do not deal with LTL specifications directly but rather via an equivalent automata-theoretic formalism called Büchi automata.
Definition 2 (Büchi Automaton). A Büchi automaton (or simply an automaton) is 5-tuple (S, Init, Σ, T, F ), where (1) S is a finite set of states, (2) Init ⊆ S is a set of initial states, (3) Σ ⊆ Act is a finite alphabet, (4) T ⊆ S × Σ × S is a transition relation, and (5) F ⊆ S is a set of final (or accepting) states.
As in the case of LTSs, given a Büchi automaton B = (S, Init, Σ, T, F ), we write s α −→ s to mean (s, α, s ) ∈ T . Also, for any s ∈ S and any α ∈ Σ, we denote by Succ(s, α) the set {s | s
ω is an infinite sequence of actions. The language accepted by an automaton is a set of traces defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Language). Let B = (S, Init, Σ, T, F ) be any automaton and t = α 0 , α 1 , . . . be any trace. A run r of B on t is an infinite sequence of states s 0 , s 1 , . . . such that (1) s 0 ∈ Init and (2) ∀i ≥ 0 s i α i −→ s i+1 . For any run r, we write Inf (r) to denote the set of states appearing infinitely often in r. Then, a trace t is accepted by B iff there exists a run r of B on t such that Inf (r) ∩ F = ∅. The language of B, denoted by L(B), is the set of traces accepted by B.
We define the product between an LTS and an automaton in the standard manner as follows:
be an automaton such that Σ 1 = Σ 2 . Then, the product of M and B is denoted by M ⊗ B and defined as the automaton (S, Init, Σ, T, F ) where (1) S = S 1 × S 2 , (2) Init = Init 1 × Init 2 , (3) Σ = Σ 1 , (4) F = S 1 × F 2 , and (5) T is defined as follows:
Program. We have applied our ideas to actual C programs. However, for clarity and simplicity of presentation, we use a programming language based on guarded commands. Let Var be a denumerable set of integer variables. The set of expressions Expr is defined over Var using the operators +, −, ×, ÷, =, <, ¬, ∧, and the C bit-wise operators.
Program Syntax. An assignment is a pair (v, e) where v ∈ Var denotes the left-hand side (LHS) and e ∈ Expr denotes the right-hand side (RHS). The set of assignments is denoted by Asgn. A guarded command is a triple (Grd , Evt, Cmd ) where Grd ∈ Expr is a guard, Evt ∈ Act is an event, and Cmd ∈ Asgn is an assignment. The set of guarded commands is denoted by GrdCmd . Given a guarded command gc = (g, e, c), we write Grd (gc), Evt(gc), and Cmd (gc) to denote g, e, and c respectively. Finally, a program is a pair (I, C) where I ∈ Expr expresses constraints on the initial states of the program and C ⊆ GrdCmd is a finite set of guarded commands.
Store.
A store is a function σ : Var → Z from variables to integers. The set of all stores is denoted by Sto. Any store σ naturally induces a function from expressions to integers: σ(e) is the integer obtained by evaluating e under σ.
Our language has a C-like semantics as far as variables and operators are concerned. Integers are treated as 32-bit vectors. Also, the arithmetic, relational, Boolean, and bit-wise operators are interpreted in a C-like manner. In particular, there is overflow and underflow, and zero is treated as false, while all other integers are treated as true.
Definition 5 (Store Update). Given a store σ and an assignment a = (v, e), we write a[σ] to denote the store resulting after executing a from σ. In other words, a[σ] is the same as σ for all variables other than v, while a[σ](v) = σ(e).
Definition 6 (Satisfaction). Given a store σ and an expression e, we say that σ satisfies e iff σ(e) = 0. We denote the satisfaction of e by σ as σ |= e and write σ |= e to mean ¬(σ |= e).
In the rest of this report, we use the terms formula and expression synonymously, since, as we have seen, any expression e can also be viewed as a logical formula. The models of e are simply the stores satisfying e.
Program Semantics. We now define the semantics of a program Prog in terms of a labeled transition system. Intuitively, the states of the LTS are stores, its initial states are determined by the initial condition of Prog, and its transitions are determined by the guarded commands in Prog. Formally, let Prog = (I, C) be a program. Then, the semantics of Prog, denoted by [[Prog] ], is an LTS (S, Init, Σ, T ) such that
Specification Satisfaction. Given a specification as a negated automaton Spec, we say that Prog satisfies Spec and denote this by
Temporal Logic Witness
In this section, we present our proof framework for programs. We consider a program Prog = (I, C). We begin with the notion of strongest postconditions. For any expression e, variable v, and expression t, we denote the expression obtained by simultaneously replacing all occurrences of v in e by t as e[v/t].
Definition 7 (Strongest Postcondition). Let Prog = (I, C) be a program, e be an expression, and α be an action. Then, the strongest postcondition of e with respect to α is denoted by SP[e]{α} and defined as follows:
The concept of strongest postconditions is quite standard. In particular, the following fact about strongest postconditions is fairly well-known. Recall that a state of Prog is a store. Consider any expression e and any action α. Let σ and σ be stores such that σ |= e and σ α −→ σ . Then, σ |= SP[e]{α}. This idea is captured by the following well-known fact.
Fact 1 Let Prog be a program and [[Prog]] = (S,
Init, Σ, T ) be its semantics. Let e be any expression. Then, the following holds:
In addition, the following lemma about strongest postconditions will be useful later on.
Lemma 1 Let e 1 , e 2 be any expressions and α be any action. Then, the following holds:
Proof.
SP
This completes our proof.
We are now ready to present the formal notion of a proof of Prog |= Spec. 
and R be a finite set of integral ranks. Suppose that there exists a ranking function ρ : S ⊗ → R such that the following holds:
, that is, all initial states of M ⊗ have a rank.
• (RANK2) ∀s
Then, there is no infinite path of M ⊗ that visits an accepting state infinitely often, that is,
We use a witness to encode a ranking function. We also use appropriate side-conditions to ensure that the ranking function satisfies the three conditions mentioned above. We now state this formally:
Theorem 1 (LTL Witness). Let Prog = (I, C) be a program and Spec = (S, Init, Σ, T, F ) be a specification automaton. Let R be a finite set of integral ranks. Suppose that there exists a function Ω : S × R → Expr that satisfies the following four conditions: ] are stores, and hence the set of states of M ⊗ is Sto × S. Thus, it suffices to define a ranking function ρ : Sto × S → R that satisfies conditions RANK1-RANK3 given above. Consider any store σ and any specification state s. Due to condition C1, there can be at most one rank r such that σ |= Ω(s, r). If such an r exists, we define ρ(σ, s) = r; else, ρ(σ, s) is undefined.
To show that ρ satisfies condition RANK1, consider any initial state (σ, s) of M ⊗ . Recall that Prog = (I, C). Hence σ |= I and s ∈ Init. By condition C2, there exists r ∈ R such that σ |= Ω(s, r). Therefore, ρ(σ, s) = r, which is what we want.
To show that ρ satisfies condition RANK2, consider any transition (σ, s) Hence from Fact 1, we know that σ |= SP[Ω(s, r)]{α}. Thus, from condition C4, we know that there exists r < r such that σ |= Ω(s , r ). Therefore, by the definition of ρ, we have ρ(σ , s ) = r < r = ρ(σ, s), which completes the proof.
Suppose we are given Prog, Spec = (S, Init, Σ, T ) and a candidate witness Ω over a set of ranks R. Since S, Σ, and R are all finite, it is straightforward to generate a formula equivalent to the conditions C1-C4 enumerated in Theorem 1. We call such a formula our verification condition and denote it by VC (Prog, Spec, Ω). In essence, on account of Theorem 1, a valid proof of VC (Prog, Spec, Ω) is also a valid proof of Prog |= Spec.
Theorem 1 is useful in checking the validity of a proposed witness Ω. However, it yields no technique to construct such a Ω. In this section, we present a procedure called predicate abstraction. In the next section, we show how to construct a valid witness using predicate abstraction. More specifically, if our procedure actually results in a witness Ω, then Ω is guaranteed to be valid. In other words, the verification condition VC (Prog, Spec, Ω) is guaranteed to be a valid formula. We begin with some preliminary definitions.
Definition 8 (Predicate).
A predicate is simply an expression. Let P be a finite set of predicates. A valuation of P is a function from P to {true, false}. The set of all valuations of P is denoted by V(P). Given a valuation V ∈ V(P) of P, the concretization of P with respect to V is denoted by γ P (V ) and is the expression defined as follows:
, where for any predicate p, we have p true = p and p false = ¬p.
In this report, we only consider finite sets of predicates. We write γ(V ) to mean γ P (V ) when P is clear from the context. The notion of concretization presented above means that any valuation V can also be thought of as the expression γ(V ) and, therefore, leads naturally to the notion of consistency between valuations and expressions and between two valuations.
Definition 9 (Consistency). Let V be a valuation of a set of predicates P and e be an expression. We say that V is consistent with e and denote this by V e, iff the expression γ(V ) ⇒ ¬e is invalid. In other words, V e ⇐⇒ ∃σ ∈ Sto σ |= γ(V ) ∧ σ |= e. Equivalently, ¬(V e) iff the expression γ(V ) ⇒ ¬e is valid.
Consistency essentially means that a valuation and an expression are not mutually exclusive. We now define the term weakest precondition, a concept closely related to the term strongest postcondition. Recall that for any expression e, variable v, and expression t, we denote the expression obtained by simultaneously replacing all occurrences of v in e by t as e[v/t].
Definition 10 (Weakest Precondition). Let Prog = (I, C) be a program, e be an expression, and α be an action. Then, the weakest precondition of e with respect to α is denoted by WP[e]{α} and defined as
The relationship between the strongest postconditions and weakest preconditions is expressed formally by the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Preconditions and Postconditions)
. Let e, e be expressions and α be an action. Then, the following holds:
Proof. Let us begin with the assumption and prove the conclusion
Expanding out the definition of WP[e ]{α} in (1), we have
Pushing negation inside from (2), we have
Hence from (3), for each (g, α, (v, t)) ∈ C, we have
Applying various proof rules on (4) gives us
Let v be a completely fresh variable. Then, we have
Since (9) can be proved for each (g, α, (v, t)) ∈ C, we have
Applying various proof rules on (10) gives us
Pulling out the negation (¬∃v
Finally, using the definition of SP[e]{α} on (15), we get
which is the desired conclusion. This completes our proof.
We are now ready to formally define the predicate abstraction of a program with respect to a set of predicates.
Predicate Abstraction. Let Prog = (I, C) be a program and P be a set of predicates. Let [[Prog]] = (S, Init, Σ, T ) be the semantics of Prog. Then, the predicate abstraction of Prog with respect to P is denoted by { {Prog} } P and defined as an LTS ( S, Init, Σ, T ) where (1) S = V(P) : the states are the valuations of P, (2) Init = {V ∈ V(P) | V I}, (3) Σ = Σ, and (4) T is defined as follows:
Predicate abstraction enables us to create finite LTS abstractions of our infinite state programs. More importantly, it can be automated. Given Prog and P, it is easy to construct { {Prog} } P from the definition given above. In order to check for consistency, we use an automated theorem prover. More specifically, suppose we want to check if V e. Then, in accordance with Definition 9, we check for the validity of γ(V ) ⇒ ¬e using a (sound) theorem prover. We assume ¬(V e) iff the theorem says that γ(V ) ⇒ ¬e is valid.
Generating LTL Witnesses. We now present an algorithm WitGen for constructing a valid witness to [[Prog] ] |= Spec. The input to WitGen is (1) a set of predicates P such that { {Prog} } P |= Spec and (2) a ranking function ρ from the states of { {Prog} } P ⊗ Spec to a finite set of ranks R that obeys conditions RANK1-RANK3 given in Section 4. We defer the question as to how such a set of predicates P and ranking function ρ may be constructed until later. The output of WitGen is a valid witness Ω. The following theorem conveys the key ideas behind our algorithm.
Theorem 2 (Valid Witness). Let Prog = (I, C) be a program, Spec = (S, Init, Σ, T, F ) be a finite specification automaton and P be a set of predicates such that { {Prog} } P |= Spec. Let { {Prog} } P = (V(P), Init, Σ, T ). Let R be a finite set of integral ranks and ρ : V(P) × S → R be a ranking function that obeys conditions RANK1-RANK3 given in Section 4. Now consider the witness Ω : S × R → Expr defined as follows:
Proof. It suffices to show that Ω satisfies conditions C1-C4 given in Theorem 1. We first prove C1 by contradiction. Consider any s ∈ S and r, r ∈ R such that r = r and Ω(s, r) ∧ Ω(s, r ) is satisfiable. Now, we know that
But this means there is some valuation V ∈ V(P) such that ρ(V, s) = r = r = ρ(V, s), which is a contradiction. This completes the proof of C1. For the rest of the proof, we note that the following formula is valid:
The above statement holds because it is logically equivalent to the following formula:
To prove C2, consider any s ∈ Init and any V ∈ Init. From Definition 4, we know that (V, s) is an initial state of { {Prog} } P ⊗ Spec. Since ρ satisfies RANK1, there exists r ∈ R such that ρ(V, s) = r. Hence, from the definition of Ω, we have
Now, from the definition of predicate abstraction, we know that I ⇒ ¬γ(V ) for each V ∈ V(P) \ Init. Hence, the following holds:
Also, from (2), we can conclude the following:
From (5) and (6), we know that
Finally, from (4) and (7), we have
which is precisely C2. To prove C3, consider any s ∈ S \ F , any α ∈ Σ, any r ∈ R, and any V such that ρ(V, s) = r. From the definition of predicate abstraction, we know that, for each V ∈ V(P) \ Succ(V, α), the following holds:
Using Lemma 2, for each V ∈ V(P) \ Succ(V, α), we have
Hence, the following holds:
Also, from (2), we can conclude
From (11) and (12), we have
Now consider any s ∈ Succ(s, α). From Definition 4, we know that
is a transition of { {Prog} } P ⊗ Spec and also that (V, s) is not an accepting state of { {Prog} } P ⊗ Spec. Since ρ obeys condition RANK2, we know that ρ(V , s ) ≤ ρ(V, s) = r. Hence, from the definition of Ω, we have
Since V is an arbitrary element of Succ(V, α), from (14), we have
From (13) and (15), we have
Since V is any valuation such that ρ(V, s) = r, from (16), we have which is precisely C3. The proof of C4 is very similar to that of C3. We present it here for the sake of completeness. Consider any s ∈ F , any α ∈ Σ, any r ∈ R, and any V such that ρ(V, s) = r. From the definition of predicate abstraction, we know that, for each V ∈ V(P) \ Succ(V, α), the following holds:
From (22) and (23), we have
is a transition of { {Prog} } P ⊗ Spec and also that (V, s) is an accepting state of { {Prog} } P ⊗ Spec. Since ρ obeys condition RANK3, we know that ρ(V , s ) < ρ(V, s) = r. Hence, from the definition of Ω, we have
Since V is an arbitrary element of Succ(V, α), from (25), we have which is precisely C4. This completes the proof.
Getting Predicates and Ranking Functions. Theorem 2 immediately leads to an algorithm WitGen to construct a valid witness Ω to Prog |= Spec. However, WitGen requires as input an appropriate set of predicates P such that { {Prog} } P |= Spec, as well as a ranking function ρ satisfying the conditions mentioned in Theorem 2. A suitable P may be constructed by combining predicate abstraction with CEGAR. More specifically, starting with an initially empty P, we use the following iterative procedure:
1. Construct { {Prog} } P .
2. Check if { {Prog} } P |= Spec. If so, we are done. Otherwise, we obtain a counterexample CE to { {Prog} } P |= Spec.
Check if CE is a valid counterexample. If so, then
Prog |= Spec. Hence, no suitable P exists, and we exit unsuccessfully.
4. Otherwise, we construct a new set of predicates P such that P eliminates CE and then go back to Step 1.
Full details of such a procedure can be found elsewhere [Chaki 04b ]. Due to the fundamental undecidability of the problem, such an approach is not always guaranteed to terminate. However, CEGAR-based techniques have been reported to be quite successful [Ball 01, Henzinger 02b, Chaki 04a] in software verification in recent times.
Generating the Ranking Function. Once an appropriate set of predicates P has been found by the above procedure, we have to construct a ranking function ρ. More precisely, suppose that { {Prog} } P = (V(P), Init, Σ, T ) and Spec = (S, Init, Σ, T, F ). Then, we have to construct (1) a finite set of integral ranks R and (2) a ranking function ρ : V(P) × S → R that obeys conditions RANK1-RANK3 given in Section 4. We now give an algorithm to achieve these two goals.
Let us denote { {Prog} } P ⊗ Spec by M ⊗ and let M ⊗ = (S ⊗ , Init ⊗ , Σ, T ⊗ , F ⊗ ). Without loss of generality, we assume that both S ⊗ and F ⊗ only contain the states of M ⊗ that are reachable from Init ⊗ via the transition relation. Our ranking function is defined on only S ⊗ , and undefined for unreachable states of M ⊗ .
First, we note that M ⊗ can be viewed as a directed graph
Given any two nodes s and s , we say that s s iff there is a path from s to s in G. In other words, s s iff there exists a finite 
. A strongly connected component (SCC) of G ⊗ is a set of nodes X ⊆ N such that ∀s ∈ X ∀s ∈ X s s . A node of G ⊗ that does not belong to any SCC is called a finitary node. It is evident that a node n is finitary iff for every run x of M ⊗ we have n ∈ Inf (x). We also know that { {Prog} } P |= Spec and hence L(M ⊗ ) = ∅. This means that every accepting state s ∈ F ⊗ must be finitary.
It is also well-known that every directed graph G induces a directed acyclic graph G SCC . The nodes of G SCC are the maximal strongly connected components and the finitary nodes of G, while its edges are induced by those of G. Let G SCC ⊗ be the directed acyclic graph induced by G ⊗ . Let O = n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n k be a topological ordering of the nodes of G SCC ⊗ such that if n i n j , then n j appears before n i in O. We now fix our set of ranks R to be {1, 2, . . . , k} where k = |O|. We first define a ranking function ρ SCC for the nodes of G SCC ⊗ as follows: ρ SCC (n) = i iff n = n i according to the ordering O. We then use ρ SCC to define a ranking function ρ for G ⊗ as follows:
• If n is a finitary node, it is also a node of G SCC ⊗ . Then ρ(n) = ρ SCC (n).
• Otherwise n belongs to an unique maximal SCC n SCC , which is a node of G SCC ⊗ . In this case, ρ(n) = ρ SCC (n SCC ).
As an example, Figure 1 shows a G on the left and the induced G SCC on the right. Each node of G is labeled by its rank inferred from a particular topological ordering.
We now show that ρ satisfies conditions RANK1-RANK3 given in Section 4. Condition RANK1 holds because Init ⊗ ⊆ S ⊗ = Domain(ρ). For condition RANK2, consider any transition s α −→ s of M ⊗ such that s ∈ F ⊗ . Now, since s s , we have ρ(s) ≥ ρ(s ), which is precisely RANK2. For condition RANK3, consider any transition s α −→ s of M ⊗ such that s ∈ F ⊗ . Recall that in this case, s must be a finitary node. Hence ρ(s) = ρ(s ). Since s s , we have ρ(s) > ρ(s ), which is precisely RANK3.
The use of ranking functions for proofs of liveness properties is well studied, and ours is but another instance of this methodology. The use, and limitations, of CEGAR for generating appropriate predicates are orthogonal to the witness construction procedure. In practice, any oracle capable of providing a suitable set of predicates can be substituted for CEGAR. For instance, some of the predicates can be supplied manually, and the remaining predicates may be constructed automatically.
SAT-Based Certificates
Suppose we are given a program Prog, a specification Spec, and a candidate witness Ω. We wish to check the validity of Ω. To this end, we construct the verification condition VC = VC (Prog, Spec, Ω) and prove that VC is valid. One way to achieve this goal is to pass VC as a query to an existing proof-generating automated theorem prover such as cvc or vampyre. However, there are at least two shortcomings to this approach.
First, most theorem provers treat integers, as well as operations on integers, in a manner that is incompatible with the semantics of our programming language. For example, our language defines integers to be 32-bit vectors, and operations such as addition and multiplication are defined in accordance with two's-complement arithmetic. In contrast, for most theorem provers, integers have an infinite domain, and the operations on them are the ones we learned in primary school. An important consequence of this discrepancy is that certificates generated by conventional theorem provers may be untrustworthy for our purposes. For example, the following verification condition is declared valid by most conventional theorem provers, including cvc and vampyre: ∀x (x + 1) > x. However, that statement is actually invalid according to our language semantics due to the possibility of overflow.
In addition, the proofs generated by such theorem provers are usually quite large (see Figure 3) . We propose the use of a SAT-based proof-generating decision procedure to overcome both hurdles. Recall that the verification conditions we are required to prove are essentially expressions. Given a verification condition VC , we check its validity as follows:
1. We translate VC to a SAT formula Φ in conjunctive normal form such that VC is valid iff Φ is unsatisfiable. In essence, Φ represents the negation of VC .
2. We check for the satisfiability of Φ using a SAT solver. If Φ is found to be satisfiable, VC is invalid. Otherwise, Φ is unsatisfiable, and therefore VC is valid. In such a case, our SAT solver also emits a resolution 2 proof P that refutes Φ. We use P as the proof of validity of VC .
In our implementation, we use the cprover [Kroening 02] tool to perform Step 1 above.
Step 2 is performed by the state-of-the-art SAT solver zchaff [Moskewicz 01], which is capable of generating resolution-based refutation proofs [Zhang 03 ]. The zchaff distribution also comes with a proof checker, which we use to verify the correctness of the proofs emitted by zchaff as a sanity check. We discuss our experimental results in detail in Section 7. We note here that, in almost all cases, SAT-based proofs are over 100 times (in one case, over 10 5 times) more compact than those generated by cvc and vampyre. Of course, our proofs are additionally faithful to the semantics of our programming language.
It is important to understand how our approach addresses the two shortcomings of conventional theorem provers presented at the beginning of this section. The first problem regarding language semantics is handled by the translation from VC to Φ in Step 1 above.
Of course, the translator itself now becomes part of our trusted computing base. However, we believe that such a decision is amply justified by the resulting benefits.
The second difficulty with large proof sizes is mitigated by the fact that a Φ generated from real-life programs and specifications often has an extremely compact resolution refutation. Intuitively, if a program is correct, it is usually so because of some simple reason. In practice, this simple reason for correctness results in Φ having a much smaller unsatisfiable core C. In essence, C is a subset of the clauses in Φ that is itself unsatisfiable. Since Φ is in CNF form, it is possible to refute Φ by simply refuting C. State-of-the-art SAT solvers, such as zchaff, leverage this idea by first computing a small unsatisfiable core of the target formula and then generating a refutation for only the core. Section 7 contains more details about the kind of compression we are typically able to obtain by using the unsatisfiable core.
Finally, we note that the use of SAT guarantees trustworthiness of the generated certificate, even if we use a non-SAT-based theorem prover, such as simplify [Nelson 80 ], for predicate abstraction. The trustworthiness of the generated certificate enables us to use fast, but potentially unfaithful, theorem provers during the verification stage and still remain faithful to C semantics as far as certification is concerned.
Simulation
While LTL allows us to reason about both safety and liveness properties, it is nevertheless restricted to a purely linear notion of time. Simulation enables us to reason about the branching time properties of programs, since it preserves all specifications in the ACTL* temporal logic.
Definition 11 (Simulation). Let M 1 = (S 1 , Init 1 , Σ, T 1 ) and M 2 = (S 2 , Init 2 , Σ, T 2 ) be two LTSs. Note that M 1 and M 2 have the same alphabet. A relation R ⊆ S 1 × S 2 is said to be a simulation relation if it satisfies the following condition:
We say that M 1 is simulated by M 2 and denote this by M 1 M 2 , iff there exists a simulation relation R ⊆ S 1 × S 2 such that ∀s 1 ∈ Init 1 ∃s 2 ∈ Init 2 (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ R.
Simulation Witness. We are now ready to present the formal notion of a proof of Prog Spec. Such a proof essentially encodes a simulation relation between Prog and Spec. The idea is to use a mapping Ω from states of Spec to expressions such that for any state s of Spec, Ω(s) is satisfied by those states of Prog that are simulated by Spec. We now state this formally. Proof. Recall that the states of [[Prog] ] are stores. Consider the relation R ⊆ Sto × S defined as follows : (σ, s) ∈ R ⇐⇒ σ |= Ω(s). We first show that (GOAL1) R is a simulation relation by proving that R satisfies condition (SIM) from Definition 11.
Next, we prove that (GOAL2) for every initial state σ of [[Prog]], there is an initial state s of Spec such that (σ, s) ∈ R. From the definition of program semantics, we know that σ |= I. Then, from condition (D1) above, we know that ∃s ∈ Init σ |= Ω(s). Therefore, from the definition of R, we have (σ, s) ∈ R. This completes the proof of GOAL2. Finally, from GOAL1, GOAL2, and Definition 11, we conclude that [[Prog] ] Spec.
Suppose we are given Prog, Spec = (S, Init, Σ, T ) and a candidate witness Ω. Since both S and Σ are finite, it is straightforward to generate a formula equivalent to the conditions D1-D2 enumerated in Theorem 3. We call such a formula our verification condition and denote it by VC (Prog, Spec, Ω). In essence, on account of Theorem 3, a valid proof of VC (Prog, Spec, Ω) is also a valid proof of Prog Spec.
Generating Simulation Witnesses. We now present an algorithm WitGenSimul for constructing a valid witness to [[Prog] ] Spec. The input to WitGenSimul is a set of predicates P such that { {Prog} } P Spec and a simulation relation R between the states of { {Prog} } P and the states of Spec. We defer the question as to how such a set of predicates P and simulation relation R may be constructed until later. The output of WitGenSimul is a valid witness Ω. The following theorem conveys the key ideas behind our algorithm.
Theorem 4 (Valid Witness).
Let Prog = (I, C) be a program, Spec = (S, Init, Σ, T ) be a finite LTS, and P be a set of predicates such that { {Prog} } P Spec. Let { {Prog} } P = (V(P), Init, Σ, T ) and R ⊆ V(P) × S be a simulation relation such that (A1) ∀V ∈ Init ∃s ∈ Init (V, s) ∈ R. Let us also define a function θ : S → 2 V(P) as follows: (A2) ∀s ∈ S θ(s) = {V | (V, s) ∈ R}. Now, consider the witness Ω : S → Expr defined as follows: (A3) ∀s ∈ S Ω(s) = V ∈θ(s) γ(V ). Then, Ω is a valid witness to
Proof. Clearly, the following formula is valid:
This is because (1) is equivalent to the following formula:
First, we show that condition D1 of Theorem 3 holds. From A1, A2, and A3 above, we conclude that the following is valid:
Also, from (1), we can conclude the following:
From (4) and (5), we know that
Finally, from (3) and (6), we have
which is precisely D1. We now show that condition D2 of Theorem 3 holds. Consider any state s ∈ S, any V ∈ θ(s), and any α ∈ Σ. From the definition of predicate abstraction, we know that, for each V ∈ V(P) \ Succ(V, α), the following holds:
Also, from (1), we can conclude
From (10) and (11), we have
Since (V, s) ∈ R and R is a simulation relation, we have
Hence, from (12) and (13), we know that
γ(V ) (6.14)
From (14) and the definition of Ω, we have
Since V is any element of θ(s), from (15), we have
Ω(s ) (6.16) From (16) and Lemma 1, we have
Again, from (17) and the definition of Ω, we have
which is precisely D2. This completes our proof.
Getting Simulation Predicates. Theorem 4 immediately leads to an algorithm
WitGenSimul to construct a valid witness Ω to Prog Spec. However, WitGenSimul requires as input an appropriate set of predicates P such that { {Prog} } P Spec. As in the case of LTL model checking, such a P may be constructed by combining predicate abstraction with CEGAR. More specifically, starting with an initially empty P, we use the following iterative procedure:
2. Check if { {Prog} } P Spec. If so, we are done. Otherwise, we obtain a counterexample CE to { {Prog} } P Spec.
3. Check if CE is a valid counterexample. If so, then Prog Spec. Hence, no suitable P exists, and we exit unsuccessfully.
Full details of such a procedure can be found elsewhere [Chaki 05a ]. As in the case of LTL, due to the fundamental undecidability of the problem, such an approach is not always guaranteed to terminate but has been found to be quite effective in practice.
Witness Minimization. It is clear from Theorem 4 that the size of witnesses and proofs generated by WitGenSimul is directly related to the size of the simulation relation R between { {Prog} } P and Spec. In this section, we describe an algorithm to construct a minimal simulation relation between two finite LTSs, if such a relation exists. Clearly, such an algorithm can be used to construct an R of minimal size, which would, in turn, lead to a witness Ω of small size.
Our algorithm relies on a well-known technique [Chaki 04a ] to check for simulation between finite LTSs using satisfiability for weakly negated HORNSAT formulas. More specifically, suppose we are given two finite LTSs M 1 = (S 1 , Init 1 , Σ, T 1 ) and M 2 = (S 2 , Init 2 , Σ, T 2 ). Then, we can construct a propositional CNF formula Ψ such that the set of variables appearing in Ψ is S 1 × S 2 . Intuitively, a variable (s 1 , s 2 ) stands for the proposition that state s 1 can be simulated by state s 2 .
The clauses of Ψ encode constraints imposed by a simulation relation and are constructed as follows. For each s 1 ∈ S 1 , each s 2 ∈ S 2 , each α ∈ Σ, and each s 1 ∈ Succ(s 1 , α), we add the following clause to Ψ: (s 1 , s 2 ) ⇒ s 2 ∈Succ(s 2 ,α) (s 1 , s 2 ). Intuitively, the above clause expresses the requirement that for s 2 to simulate s 1 , at least one α-successor of s 2 must simulate s 1 . Also, for each s 1 ∈ Init 1 , we add the following clause to Ψ: s 2 ∈Init 2 (s 1 , s 2 ). These clauses assert that every initial state of M 1 must be simulated by some initial state of M 2 . Now, Ψ has the following simple property. Let X be any satisfying assignment of Ψ, and for any variable v = (s 1 , s 2 ), let us write X(s 1 , s 2 ) to mean the Boolean value assigned to v by X. Then, the relation R = {(s 1 , s 2 ) | X(s 1 , s 2 ) = true} is a simulation relation between M 1 and M 2 .
Therefore, we can construct a minimal simulation between M 1 and M 2 by constructing Ψ and then looking for a satisfying assignment X such that the number of variables assigned true by X is as small as possible. This task can be achieved by using a solver for pseudo-Boolean formulas [Aloul 02] . A pseudo-Boolean formula is essentially a propositional formula coupled with an arithmetic constraint over the propositional variables (where true is treated as one and false as zero). More specifically, recall that the set of variables of Ψ is S 1 × S 2 . We thus solve for Ψ along with the constraint that the following sum be minimized: Υ = s∈S 1 ×S 2 s. We then construct a minimal simulation relation using any satisfying assignment to Ψ that also minimizes Υ.
Hardness of Finding Minimal Simulation Relations. One may complain that solving pseudo-Boolean formula satisfiability (an NP-complete problem) to verify simulation (for which polynomial time algorithms exist) is overkill. However, the use of a pseudo-Boolean solver is justified by the fact that finding a minimal simulation between two finite LTSs is actually an NP-hard problem.
We now prove this claim by reducing subgraph isomorphism, a well-known NP-complete problem, to the problem of finding a minimal simulation relation between two LTSs. In the rest of this section, whenever we mention a simulation relation between the LTSs M 1 and M 2 , we also tacitly assume that every initial state of M 1 is simulated by some initial state of M 2 .
Definition 12 (Graph). An undirected graph is a pair (V , E ) where V is a set of vertices and E ⊆ V × V is a symmetric irreflexive relation denoting edges.
Definition 13 (Subgraph Isomorphism). Given two graphs G 1 = (V 1 , E 1 ) and G 2 = (V 2 , E 2 ) such that |V 1 | < |V 2 |, we say that G 1 is subgraph isomorphic to G 2 iff there exists an injection µ : V 1 → V 2 that obeys the following condition:
Note that we do not allow self-loops in graphs. It is well-known that, given two arbitrary graphs G 1 and G 2 , the problem of deciding whether G 1 is subgraph isomorphic to G 2 is NP-complete. We now show that this problem has a log-space reduction to the problem of finding a minimal simulation relation between two LTSs. In essence, from G 1 and G 2 , we Recall that −→ v to T 1 . The LTS M 2 is constructed from graph G 2 in an analogous manner. As an example, Figure 2 shows two graphs G 1 and G 2 , as well as the LTSs M 1 and M 2 constructed from them. A bidirectional arrow between two states (of M 1 or M 2 ) represents a pair of transitions-one from each state to the other. Note that M 1 and M 2 can be constructed using logarithmic additional space. Now our NP-hardness reduction is completed by the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (Reduction).
Let n be the number of states of M 1 (i.e., n = |S 1 |). Then, G 1 is subgraph isomorphic to G 2 iff a minimal simulation relation between M 1 and M 2 has n elements.
Proof. Let R be any minimal simulation relation between M 1 and M 2 . First, note that since every state of M 1 is initial, R must have at least n elements. To prove the forward implication, assume that G 1 is subgraph isomorphic to G 2 , and let µ be a function satisfying the condition of Definition 13. Then, the following relation R is clearly a minimal simulation relation, since it has exactly n elements:
To prove the reverse implication, suppose that R is a minimal simulation relation between M 1 and M 2 containing n elements. Since each of the n states of M 1 must be simulated, R must relate each state of M 1 to a unique state of M 2 . Now, consider the function µ : S 1 → S 2 , which is defined as follows:
We show that µ satisfies the criterion in Definition 13 as follows:
Now, we must show that µ is an injection. Suppose that µ was not an injection. In that case, we have two elements v 1 and v 1 of V 1 such that µ(v 1 ) = µ(v 1 ) = v 2 , let's say. But then, M 2 must contain at least one of the following two transitions:
This is clearly impossible, and it also completes our proof.
Figure 3: Comparison of cvc, vampyre, and SAT-Based Proof Generation
The symbol × indicates that results are not available. Best figures appear in boldface. The LOC column contains lines of code. The cvc, vampyre, and SAT columns refer to proof sizes in bytes (after compressing with the gzip utility) obtained with cvc, vampyre, and SAT, respectively. The cvc statistics were obtained via ComFoRT. The blast statistics were obtained using either Version 2.0 of blast or an existing publication (indicated by an asterisk [*]). The Cert column mentions the gzipped certificate (i.e., witness + proof of the verification condition) size with SAT. The Core column contains the factors by which the unsatisfiable core is smaller than the original SAT formula. Finally, the Improve column refers to factors by which SAT-based proofs are smaller than the nearest other proofs.
The Linux device drivers were obtained from kernel 2.6.11.10. We checked that the drivers obey the following conventions with spin lock and spin unlock: (1) locks must be acquired and released alternately beginning with an acquire (safe) and (2) every acquire must be eventually followed by a release (live). The Windows drivers are instrumented so that an ERROR location is reached if any illegal behavior is executed. We certified that ERROR is unreachable for all the drivers we experimented with. For OpenSSL (Version 0.9.6c), we certified that the initial handshake between a server and a client obeys the protocol specified in the SSL 3.0 specification. For Micro-C (Version 2.72), we certified that the calls to OS ENTER CRITICAL and OS EXIT CRITICAL obey the two locking conventions mentioned above.
In almost all cases, SAT-based proofs are over 100 times more compact than those generated by cvc and vampyre. In one instance-tlan.c (live)-the improvement is by a factor of more than 10 5 . We also find that an important reason for such improvement is that the UNSAT-cores are much smaller (by over two to three orders of magnitude) than the actual SAT formulas. Upon closer inspection, we discovered that this is due to the simplicity of the verification conditions. For instance, the device drivers satisfy the locking conventions because of local coding conventions (every procedure with a lock has a matching unlock). In practice, this results in very simple verification conditions. Proofs generated by cvc and vampyre suffer from redundancies and inefficient encodings and therefore turn out to be large even for such simple formulas. In contrast, SAT formulas generated from these simple verification conditions are characterized by small unsatisfiable cores.
We note that the total size of the certificate is usually dominated by the size of the witness. Finally, we find that certificates for liveness policies tend to be larger than those for the corresponding safety policies. This is due to the additional information required to encode the ranking function, which is considerably more complex for liveness specifications.
Conclusion
We have formalized a notion of witnesses for satisfaction of linear temporal logic specifications by infinite state programs and of simulation conformance between infinite state programs and finite state machine specifications. We have described how such witnesses may be constructed via predicate abstraction and validated by generating and proving verification conditions.
We have proposed the use of SAT-based theorem provers and resolution proofs in proving these verification conditions. Our experimental results on nontrivial benchmarks suggest that a SAT-based approach can yield extremely compact proofs. Our SAT-based approach also overcomes several limitations of conventional theorem provers when applied to the verification of real-life programs.
There is an evident need for techniques to obtain compact proofs in a wide variety of disciplines. Algorithms to compress and compact proof representations are currently a topic of active research. In this context, the use of powerful SAT technology appears to be a very promising idea and warrants further investigation. Extending the set of properties that can be certified effectively would also enhance the scope of the work presented in this report. Finally, the usefulness of SAT for constructing compact proofs for the purpose of generating proof-carrying binary code remains an important yet open question.
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